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 Maintaining a competitive edge in the twenty-first century is no small feat for any large, hierarchically based, and geographically dispersed organiza-
tion, such as the U.S. Navy.1 While there are many initiatives designed to keep 
pace with the tsunami of technological developments and ever-evolving global 
politics, the role of leadership in charting a course to excel in this environment 
is paramount.
This article tells the story of Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard’s experience culti-
vating the type of transformational leadership necessary to succeed—and even 
thrive—in today’s rapidly changing, complex world. Having applied a learning-
organization framework for more than a decade, the shipyard has changed how 
its members think, act, and communicate. By shifting its workplace culture from 
one that was stratified, stovepiped, and command-and-control oriented to one 
that encourages risk taking, adaptation, and individual empowerment (without 
changing its organizational structure), Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard (PHNS) not 
only has improved its performance significantly but has expanded the notion of 
what it means to be a leader in the Navy.
MILITARY ADAPTATION, INNOVATION, AND TRANSFORMATION
The military’s primary role is to respond to threats to national security. These 
threats may come in many forms—political, eco-
nomic, and ideological, to name a few—and often 
they occur with little to no warning. Operating in 
such a complicated, complex, and unpredictable 
environment, the military must remain vigilant 
in its efforts to stay abreast of changing condi-
tions and be able to adapt to them quickly. In his 
landmark publication The Professional Soldier 
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(1960), Morris Janowitz underscored this point, noting that, contrary to popular 
opinion, the military as an institution is not static but adapts in response to the 
changing conditions of the society. For instance, following World War II the 
international context changed significantly, to a situation in which the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons and strategic concepts of dissuasion led to a trans-
formation of military professionals’ function; instead of seeking victory on the 
battlefield, they became controllers of a machine designed to remain inactive.2 
Military and diplomatic historian Williamson Murray also highlights the 
adaptive nature of military organizations. In his book Military Adaptation in 
War: With Fear of Change, he presents several historical case studies examining 
how military organizations cope with changing conditions. In particular, he 
focuses on the impact of new technological, strategic, operational, and tactical 
concepts with respect to the services’ performance. He notes that adaptation 
in the military occurred at a glacial pace until technological and sociological 
changes of the Industrial Revolution began to interfere with the processes of 
war. This called for continual change, during peacetime and war, in response 
to an increasingly complex battle space—making adaptation a major element 
in military effectiveness. And this continual change must occur despite the fact 
that “discipline and rigid respect for one’s superiors—on which cohesion in 
battle depends—are antithetical to the processes of adaptation, which require 
a willingness on the part of subordinates to question the revealed wisdom of 
their superiors.”3 Murray goes on to observe that the inherent tension between 
the need for military organizations to be disciplined and obedient and the 
need for organizations to be able to adapt to constant change is what “makes 
military innovation in peacetime and adaptation in war so difficult.”4 Difficult 
or not, forces affecting national defense in today’s world—including disruptive 
technologies, cyber warfare, and protracted conflict against nonstate actors in 
a low-tech, global war on terrorism—have both accelerated armed conflict and 
modified our notions of warfare, creating the need for continuous processes of 
innovation and adaptation.5 
Although military organizations must (and do) adapt to changing condi-
tions to fulfill their missions successfully, this sort of flexibility generally is not 
considered to be part of the culture of military organizations.6 On the contrary, 
the military is renowned for being one of the oldest and most prominent exam-
ples of formal organizations, forged by tradition and seemingly more commit-
ted to the ethos of the past than to preparing to meet the future.7 Similarly, the 
bureaucracies (both civilian and military) that run the military also can inhibit 
flexibility and the ability to effect change, since they strive to impose order on 
disorder rather than adapting to a changing and uncertain world.8 
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While adaptation and innovation in the military occur despite considerable 
constraints, developing this capacity in anticipation of fluctuating conditions 
rather than merely in response to them marks the difference between adequately 
and high-performing organizations. At the core of high-performing organiza-
tions are leaders who encourage followers to act independently to achieve goals 
that represent the values and motivations of both leaders and followers.
According to James MacGregor Burns, an American historian, political 
scientist, and authority on the study of leadership, this type of leadership 
is transforming leadership. Burns identified two basic forms of leadership, 
transactional and transforming. He considered transactional leadership to be 
the most common, existing where “leaders approach followers with an eye 
to exchanging one thing for another,” such as wages for labor or influence 
for campaign contributions; transactional leaders essentially are brokers. 
Transforming leaders, on the other hand, recognize and exploit an existing 
need or demand of a potential follower. They also look for possible motives 
and higher needs in followers, engaging the follower as a complete person.9 
Leaders in the military (as in most organizations) generally fall into Burns’s 
transactional leader category.
To meet the multiple, complex challenges of the twenty-first century, the 
Navy needs more leaders who can transform rather than simply transact. 
As the Navy’s 2016 Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority makes clear, 
today’s security environment—characterized by a rapid pace of change in the 
maritime system, in the information system, and in the evolution and adop-
tion of technology—is one in which “[o]ur competitors are moving quickly, 
and our adversaries are bent on leaving us swirling in their wake” as they hone 
their ability to adapt swiftly to this new environment. In response, Navy leaders 
should accelerate learning by individuals, teams, and organizations, since do-
ing so empowers, enables, and facilitates the true potential of sailors, officers, 
and Department of the Navy civilians to determine the best ways to operate in 
today’s security environment.10 
IMPROVING PERFORMANCE AT PEARL HARBOR  
NAVAL SHIPYARD
Considered even then to be a strategic location between the U.S. mainland and 
the rest of the Asia-Pacific region, Hawaii became home to Navy Yard Pearl Har-
bor (NYPH) on 13 May 1908. Operationally, NYPH served as a vital mid-Pacific 
coaling and repair station for the U.S. Navy. Strategically, it served as a defensive 
outpost. According to Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), parent com-
mand of what is known today as Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard, “[t]he Shipyard 
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has continuously improved from its modest creation as a coaling and repair sta-
tion into a world-class Navy complex . . . enabl[ing] the U.S. Navy to secure sea 
lanes of communication and commerce, effectively projecting power across the 
expansive Pacific and Indian oceans.” Today, PHNS is the nation’s largest, most 
comprehensive fleet-repair and -maintenance facility between the U.S. West 
Coast and the Far East.11 
Navy Yard Pearl Harbor performed a near miracle in 1942 when it managed 
to repair fully USS Yorktown (CV 10), which had been damaged badly in the 
Battle of the Coral Sea, in a mere three days, despite estimates that it would 
take ninety days to complete repairs of that magnitude. During the battle, “[a] 
551-pound armor-piercing bomb had plunged through the flight deck 15 feet 
inboard of her island and penetrated fifty feet into the ship before exploding 
above the forward engine room. Six compartments were destroyed, as were 
the lighting systems on three decks and across 24 frames. The gears control-
ling the No. 2 elevator were damaged. She had lost her radar and refrigeration 
system. Near misses by eight bombs had opened seams in her hull from frames 
100 to 130 and ruptured the fuel-oil compartments.” Despite the extensive 
damage, 1,400 repairmen—shipfitters, machinists, welders, electricians, and 
shipwrights—worked around the clock to restore Yorktown’s structures and 
systems. Integrated with the team were planners and estimators who worked 
on board providing advice directly from the ship’s plans. This impressive team-
work enabled the speedy repair of Yorktown, allowing it to contribute to the 
decisive victory in the Battle of Midway—a pivotal point for the Allies in World 
War II in the Pacific.12 
Some sixty years later, however, PHNS no longer was living up to its motto 
“We Keep Them Fit to Fight.” Instead, the shipyard was “struggling with perfor-
mance issues and was generally recognized as being the worst performing ship-
yard, the fourth of the four public shipyards.” The Base Realignment and Closure 
(BRAC) commission noted that cost, efficiency, and quality at PHNS were major 
issues of concern, and that it had considered closing the shipyard in 2005. After a 
great deal of deliberation involving congressional testimony, factors such as Pearl 
Harbor’s location in the Pacific, the need for surge maintenance capacity, and 
the impact the shipyard had on Hawaii’s economy kept PHNS from being closed 
down.13 Yet although the BRAC commission’s recommendation was not followed 
and the shipyard was not closed, “it did get the attention of the men and women 
of Pearl Harbor and the leadership at the Naval Reactors Program.” The Naval 
Reactors Program “provides the design, development and operational support 
required to provide militarily effective nuclear propulsion plants and ensure their 
safe, reliable and long-lived operation.”14 
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The shipyard’s continual poor performance over time, combined with calls 
to close the yard through the BRAC process, made it clear that PHNS needed 
to change. The lead Naval Reactors representative acknowledged this and re-
sponded in an uncharacteristic way for a senior leader. Rather than directing 
others to make necessary changes, “he began the path to change [by first] creat-
ing change within himself.” He demonstrated this during a standard NAVSEA 
review of the shipyard. “Instead of focusing leadership’s attention on the nu-
merous shortcomings and deficiencies that were identified during the review, 
the lead Naval Reactors representative chose to share his belief in the shipyard 
and what its leaders were capable of.” Just as PHNS had made a critical differ-
ence during World War II, so too was it capable of high-quality performance 
today. By focusing on a vision of what the shipyard could be, the Naval Reac-
tors representative “created a spark that would fuel the drive to transform the 
shipyard into a learning organization.”
THE SHIPYARD BECOMES A LEARNING ORGANIZATION
While the Naval Reactors representative’s vision of what PHNS could be (again) 
ignited a transformation, Peter Senge’s concept of a learning organization turned 
that spark into a long-burning flame. The representative believed that Senge’s 
learning-organization framework, explained in his book The Fifth Discipline: 
The Art and Practice of the Learning Organization, would help PHNS return to 
its legacy as a shipyard capable of delivering high-quality work and performing 
exceptional feats. Consequently, he familiarized the shipyard leadership with the 
concept and book during a routine visit.
Senge, a systems engineer and major figure in organizational development, be-
lieves that only those organizations that are able to adapt quickly and effectively 
will be able to excel in their field or market. Those that do this are organizations 
skilled at creating, acquiring, and transferring knowledge and at modifying their 
behavior to reflect new knowledge and insights.15 In brief, a learning organization 
is one “that is continually expanding its capacity to create its future . . . where 
‘adaptive learning’ must be joined by ‘generative learning,’ learning that enhances 
our capacity to create.”16 
Senge’s learning-organization model consists of the following five disciplines:17 
1. Personal mastery: continual clarification of what is important to us and 
learning how to see current reality more clearly
2. Mental models: deeply held internal images of how the world works
3. Shared vision: what you and the other members want to create or 
accomplish as part of the organization
5
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4. Team learning: the process of aligning and developing the capacity of a 
team to create the results its members truly desire
5. Systems thinking: a framework for seeing interrelationships rather than 
things, for seeing patterns of change rather than static “snapshots”; it also 
provides a language for complexity
These five disciplines must develop together, even though integrating new ap-
proaches is much more difficult than applying them separately. Because of this, 
systems thinking is the fifth discipline. “It is the discipline that integrates the 
disciplines, fusing them into a coherent body of theory and practice.” Systems 
thinking also helps one understand one of the subtlest, most important aspects 
of a learning organization: “a shift of mind from seeing ourselves separate from 
the world to connected to the world, from seeing problems as caused by someone 
or something ‘out there’ to seeing how our own actions create the problems we 
experience.”18 By reframing how we view the world and our role and responsibil-
ity in creating it, Senge’s learning-organization framework provides a pathway to 
creating an environment in which people are empowered to lead efforts to create 
the results they desire for their future.
While the shipyard recognized more than a decade ago that Senge’s learning- 
organization framework provided a way to improve its performance in a sus-
tained manner, the 2017 U.S. Navy Strategic Readiness Review (SRR) also ac-
knowledged the value of Senge’s concept. The review noted that, “faced with a 
dynamic environment, a learning culture is critical to ensuring adaptability of 
the organization. A culture that makes people eager to understand risk enables 
early identification of systemic risks and behaviors before problems occur.” In 
addition, the SRR went so far as to define a learning organization using Senge’s 
terms, stating that a learning organization is “an enterprise that encourages, and 
ultimately embraces, learning through systems thinking, personal mastery, men-
tal models, shared vision, and team learning.”19 
WALKING THE TALK: FIRST STEPS
The first indication that PHNS was “walking the talk” (i.e., evolving into a 
learning organization) surfaced in connection to a routine activity: a shipyard 
performance review conducted by an external agency. Once the review was 
completed, the shipyard’s senior leadership responded to its findings during 
a formal outbrief, then spent the following year addressing the findings and 
making improvements.
But instead of conducting the performance-review process in the standard 
manner, the external review in 2006 was conducted as a learning organization 
would. Two primary actions demonstrated this. The definition of the aim of the 
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external review itself constituted the first action. Instead of highlighting discrete 
problems that needed to be fixed at PHNS, as typically was done, the review fo-
cused on what needed to be done to effect lasting change at the shipyard. As an 
example, the review team’s most significant finding was not a specific technical 
or operational problem but rather the fact that PHNS “middle management is 
unable to effect change without significant senior management involvement.” 
Bound in a confining governance structure that mirrored a military hierarchy, 
PHNS relied on top-down direction from senior leadership for all performance-
improvement initiatives. While this leadership model yielded some short-term 
gains, most efforts lost momentum over time when senior leaders stopped invest-
ing their time and energy. As a result, lasting change—and its desired outcome of 
sustained improved performance—remained elusive at the shipyard.
This idea of “stickiness” as it relates to inducing long-lasting organizational 
and cultural change is a key concept for Senge and others. Organizations often 
set out on well-intended and well-planned organizational improvements, with 
an eye toward shifting the basic culture of the organization, only to find that 
over time the organization, suffering from bureaucratic inertia, reverts to old 
habits. In contrast, the PHNS example shows a leadership team dedicated to 
persisting in an effort that was bound to take many years to complete and in 
which results would be incremental and often hard to see or measure. This level 
of strategic patience is rare within highly structured and successful organiza-
tions such as the Navy, because there is no competitor to drive organizational 
improvement. Militaries are quick to respond to enemy capability improve-
ments (hardware) with similar advancement and growth, but organizational 
and cultural change rarely is brought about through peer competition; almost 
always it is an internal crisis or near crisis that dictates organizational self-
assessment and eventual change. In bringing about enduring and sticky change, 
as seen in this example, PHNS truly has demonstrated the meaning of being a 
learning organization.
The second primary action demonstrating learning-organization behavior 
at PHNS concerned the outbrief resulting from the 2006 external performance 
review. In the past, only senior leaders from the Navy and PHNS had addressed 
review findings; during this particular outbrief, however, middle managers 
responsible for specific issues were called on to address the findings. The 
eleven middle managers who participated came to be known as the “Group of 
Eleven” (subsequently called the Learning Organization Steering Group). They 
committed individually, to the Navy and to the shipyard’s senior leaders, to be 
the middle managers and leaders the shipyard needed to start the transforma-
tional process necessary to achieve sustained improved performance. Equally 
important, Navy and the PHNS senior leadership clearly demonstrated trust 
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and support in the middle managers’ ability to improve performance over the 
long run. This was a critical event, as it illustrated to everyone in the shipyard 
that PHNS was on the path to becoming a learning organization.
One small group of middle managers started by reading The Fifth Discipline 
(which came to be known as the “black book” because of its cover). They used 
the five disciplines as a framework, with some from this group practicing per-
sonal mastery as the first step in the process, while the Group of Eleven started 
by developing a shared vision within the team. The Group of Eleven also created 
a presentation to raise awareness about PHNS’s actual performance, to ensure 
that everyone shared a common understanding about the current state of affairs. 
While the presentation addressed concrete (and uncomfortable) topics such as 
customer dissatisfaction and poor teamwork, the Group of Eleven portrayed 
these difficult facts as important for developing a way forward toward addressing 
these shortfalls in the learning-organization framework.
LEARNING-ORGANIZATION ENABLERS
In addition to conducting training sessions to educate the shipyard workforce 
about core learning-organization concepts such as the five disciplines and how 
to build a learning organization through team learning, dialogue, and discus-
sion, PHNS also established learning cells to facilitate workers’ adoption of 
learning-organization concepts and practices.20 Learning cells consisted of teams 
of people from various areas and levels of the command who wanted to think 
imaginatively about their future and came together to build better relationships 
with each other so there would be trust and openness among team members. 
They did so by engaging in free-flowing dialogue around specific topics such as 
team learning, brainstorming, and constructive dialogue that were designed to 
“suspend assumptions[,] . . . allowing the group to discover insights not attain-
able individually.” Most of the insights that led to enhanced performance revolved 
around changing people’s behaviors and interactions.
For instance, a learning cell involving workers who were striving to improve 
depot maintenance soon realized that the main obstacle to achieving this goal 
had to do with constructive dialogue rather than work schedules and budgets. 
Learning-organization dialogue principles revealed that many depot mainte-
nance workers feared project meetings, especially if they needed to report bad 
news, since their project superintendent would use these meetings to berate 
them publicly and emotionally for poor performance. When the project super-
intendent discovered this, he realized that to improve his team’s performance he 
would need to change his leadership style. Deciding to become what Senge refers 
to as a servant leader, he began to focus on how he could help his people be-
come successful. He became more engaged with his team by walking around the 
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depot, asking people what they needed, and clearing roadblocks when necessary. 
These simple actions, combined with the continual learning that took place in 
the learning cell, transformed the depot-maintenance project team, resulting in 
completion of the shortest depot maintenance period of the last five maintenance 
periods at both public and private shipyards.
In addition to facilitating group learning and building trust and under-
standing, the cells were an expeditious way to effect change. Unlike other 
performance-improvement processes that the shipyard had implemented, such as 
Lean Six Sigma—which follows a regimented format, typically requiring several 
weeks to prepare for an event, a full week to conduct it, and a couple of weeks of 
postevent activities to complete the process—learning cells required much less 
time. (The effect of the earlier adoption of Lean Six Sigma is discussed in a later 
section.) In fact, an effective and efficient learning cell facilitator could prepare 
for a learning-cell gathering in a week’s time. After meeting for a few days to 
identify, prioritize, and discuss issues, a learning cell generally would walk away 
committed to carrying out agreed-upon, concrete actions. Over time, learning 
cells became the primary learning-organization structure through which the 
shipyard made many improvements.
Brainstorming sessions with middle managers and supervisors from across 
PHNS also were held as part of the learning process. These sessions created an 
environment of openness and trust that allowed attendees to identify the range 
of diverse problems at the shipyard. During brainstorming sessions, participants 
wrote their problems on pieces of paper, taped the slips to a wall, and explained 
how they highlighted a particular problem. By the time several iterations had 
been completed for one particular brainstorming session, the problems identi-
fied covered a ten-foot section of the wall. Posting the problems in this manner 
achieved two important outcomes: (1) everyone could appreciate the seriousness 
of the situation at the shipyard, and (2) similarities and patterns concerning 
certain problems and their underlying causes became evident. The problems 
then were grouped according to focus areas that needed to be worked on. With 
a multiplicity of groupings on the wall, middle managers who participated in 
the brainstorming recognized that determining top-priority areas was essential. 
Accordingly, participating middle managers conducted a blind vote (to prevent 
bias). It identified three primary focus areas: problem solving, motivation, 
and teamwork. Each area would be targeted as part of the shipyard’s learning- 
organization transformation effort.
Strong support from senior leadership was critical to facilitating the ship-
yard’s learning-organization journey. Recognizing that it would take years 
for the shipyard to transform into a learning organization, Admiral Kirkland 
H. Donald, USN, the Director of Naval Reactors during this time, provided 
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essential top cover as the shipyard pursued its transformation journey. For ex-
ample, Navy leaders from various commands were required to contact him per-
sonally first if they had any problems with the shipyard’s performance. Because 
Donald rerouted these concerns, the shipyard was able to focus its full attention 
on transforming itself into a learning organization. Moreover, senior leadership’s 
commitment sent a message to other commands that it fully supported PHNS’s 
efforts in this regard.
Command leadership documented in shipyard instructions the steps needed 
to enable and assist the shipyard in its transformation effort but underscored the 
importance of leadership. Developed by the shipyard commander in conjunction 
with midlevel managers, the Command Leadership System served two primary 
purposes, as follows: (1) it aligned command leadership, and (2) it improved ship-
yard leaders’ understanding of their multiple roles as leaders. The shipyard com-
mander recognized that leaders’ existing top-down, directive approach to leader-
ship needed to change to foster the yard’s growth as a learning organization. The 
instruction helped them do this by discussing the attributes of leaders serving in 
a learning organization, as described in the black book. It also included a descrip-
tion of the shipyard’s existing organizational and governance structure to show 
the interrelatedness of departments and leadership within the entire system of the 
shipyard. Descriptions of various leadership governance boards and the role of 
those boards in making business decisions in the shipyard were included as well.
LEARNING-ORGANIZATION CHALLENGES
Moving from generating good ideas to implementing them is a challenge that 
most organizations must face, and PHNS was no different. Senge notes that 
“[o]ne thing all managers know is that many of the best ideas never get into 
practice. Brilliant strategies fail to get translated into action. Systemic insights 
never find their way into operating policies. A pilot experiment may prove to 
everyone’s satisfaction that a new approach leads to better results, but widespread 
adoption of the approach never occurs.”21 
According to the learning-organization model, the gap between thinking and 
doing stems primarily from mental models. In other words, new insights fail to 
be put into practice because they conflict with deeply held mental models of how 
the world works—models that limit us to familiar ways of thinking and acting.22 
Middle managers at PHNS began to realize that their own mental models were 
preventing them from making the shipyard what they wanted it to be. They ad-
dressed this obstacle by creating the shipyard’s first system archetype for organi-
zational behavior, using the “limits to growth” archetype described in the black 
book. A system archetype is a pattern of structure that recurs again and again. 
The limits-to-growth archetype describes the interaction between a reinforcing 
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process (i.e., one that fosters growth) and its secondary effects that limit growth. 
Essentially, this concept of a system archetype helps people understand situations 
where growth bumps up against limits to growth.23 
By using the shipyard’s limits-to-growth archetype, the group of middle man-
agers who developed it soon recognized that, while activities such as learning 
cells, brainstorming sessions, and training did indeed promote learning- 
organization behaviors, they also limited growth. Because these activities were vol-
untary, and consequently were conducted on top of regular work responsibilities, 
they were offset “by the limit of growth of people who were not able to effectively 
manage their time.” To remove this barrier to growth, middle managers responded 
by developing and conducting training on time-management techniques.
Another challenge to the shipyard’s desire to become a learning organization 
was the Lean Six Sigma program. Recognizing the benefits of Lean Six Sigma 
methods and success in industry, in May 2008 Deputy Secretary of Defense 
Gordon R. England signed DoD-Wide Continuous Process Improvement (CPI) / 
Lean Six Sigma (LSS) Program, Directive 5010.42, which directed Department 
of Defense (DoD) services and agencies to adopt Lean Six Sigma to achieve con-
tinuous performance improvement.24 Well ahead of DoD, PHNS began to imple-
ment its own Lean Six program in 2004—only two years before the introduction 
of learning-organization concepts. The use of Lean practices gave rise to many 
mental models about performance improvement that seemed to conflict with 
learning-organization concepts; it also created many misconceptions about learn-
ing organizations. This generated increased resistance to the learning-organization 
model, as evidenced by personal conflicts between those who supported Lean 
practices and those who supported learning-organization efforts. The existence of 
two performance-improvement models—not to mention the promotion of “high-
performance organization” concepts only a few years earlier—made some people 
think that the learning-organization framework was simply the newest “flavor of 
the month.” Predictably, this situation also created wide-ranging confusion.
Changes in leadership also presented a significant challenge to the shipyard’s 
efforts to inculcate learning-organization behaviors. As those in leadership po-
sitions moved on to other positions and new leaders replaced them, it became 
apparent that those replacing the previous leaders did not share their mental 
models. This slowed the transformation process, since the new leaders were 
unable or unwilling to support the learning-organization transformation. To 
address this situation, PHNS employees who were committed to this transforma-
tion developed a workshop to reinforce learning-organization fundamentals that 
had been learned and integrated into shipyard operations and workers’ personal 
development previously. This provided a support structure for new supervisors 
who were interested in these principles and who wanted to contribute to the 
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transformation of the shipyard. The workshop also served as a coaching tool for 
teams, since it helped them to benchmark their performance by monitoring the 
routine application of learning-organization behaviors.
LEADERS IN A LEARNING ORGANIZATION
The “word ‘leader’ has come to refer largely to positional authority, a synonym for 
top management. . . . [It implies] that the only people with power to bring about 
change are those at the top of the hierarchy, not those further down.” Regrettably, 
this notion (1) creates the belief that all those who are not at the top of the hierarchy 
are not leaders and, hence, have little ability to bring about change, and (2) over-
simplifies the complex subject of “how to understand the diverse roles of leaders 
. . . and how to develop networks of leaders capable of sustaining deep change.”25 
The military possesses a cultural advantage in this respect, in that its culture 
encourages and fosters “leaders” at every level in the chain of command. For ex-
ample, a young officer on a ship is given responsibility for leading and caring for 
people immediately after reporting aboard. This long-held cultural norm encour-
ages risk taking and initiative at a very early stage in a career and provides fertile 
ground for encouraging a learning mind-set throughout the organization instead 
of simply at the top. Recognizing that initiating and sustaining profound change 
calls for different types of leadership, the leaders in a learning organization are 
designers, teachers, and stewards (described below). They also are present at all 
levels of an organization, as opposed to serving only in senior positions. 
• The leader as designer: Customarily, shipyard leaders at PHNS often viewed 
themselves as part of the command-and-control system of the shipyard, priz-
ing compliance and performing tasks and fulfilling requirements provided to 
them in written instructions. Essentially, they performed as directed accord-
ing to shipyard rules, regulations, and norms, rather than seeing the shipyard 
as a living system and themselves as designers of that system.
In contrast, learning organizations have leaders “who appreciate organiza-
tions as living organisms.”26 They see themselves as designers who can create 
“organizational artifacts” such as new metrics, innovative practices, guid-
ing ideas, or formal roles and processes. More importantly, these leaders as 
designers recognize that what truly matters is what happens when people use 
those artifacts, practices, ideas, or processes to improve performance.
• The leader as teacher: Before the shipyard’s transition into a learning organi-
zation, shipyard leaders generally were reactive when confronted with prob-
lems—they looked for quick fixes. In addition, when problems with shipyard 
personnel occurred, these leaders often relied on the shipyard’s training pro-
gram to sort them out rather than dealing with the people directly involved 
so they could understand the situation better.
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In learning organizations, leaders as teachers understand the concept of 
mental models—that is, the underlying assumptions that shape followers’ 
behaviors and actions—and use this awareness to help others see problems 
in terms of underlying systemic structures rather than merely short-term 
events. The leader’s core task as a teacher is to “help people see reality as a 
medium for creating their visions rather than as a source of limitation.”27 
• The leader as steward: Shipyard leaders tended to focus primarily on the 
needs of their own individual organizations, and in doing so they created 
“stovepipes” within PHNS. Moreover, when a problem occurred, the phrase 
“stay out of the spotlight” commonly was heard among shipyard leaders, 
since personnel preferred to have someone else in the organization take 
the blame and criticism associated with the problem. In contrast, leaders as 
stewards in learning organizations do what is right for the entire organiza-
tion; they serve a larger purpose.28 When faced with a problem, these leaders 
work with others, taking the time to understand how the entire system is 
functioning and enabling those directly involved with the problem to develop 
long-term solutions. 
In addition to recognizing the need for different types of leaders, PHNS real-
ized that facilitating lasting behavioral changes at the shipyard would take a great 
deal of time. The leadership also recognized that measuring progress would 
require unique metrics different from traditional business measurements such 
as costs and schedules. Indeed, measuring progress would require taking into ac-
count personnel interactions and behaviors such as “changes in attitude, relation-
ships, how people communicate with one another, passion, and commitment.”
CULTIVATING LEARNING-ORGANIZATION LEADERS
Creating a learning organization requires leadership that is not based on tradi-
tional hierarchy. Rather, it calls for a combination of different people from all 
levels of the system who lead in different ways and who are dependent on each 
other.29 To this end, PHNS created a course to educate the entire shipyard work-
force about learning-organization concepts. The three-day course, titled TALK 
101, helped students learn about the five learning-organization disciplines, 
what they meant, and how they related to the shipyard.30 What made this course 
impactful was not simply the information conveyed but the learning experience 
in which participants engaged. It was the first command-wide training course 
to assert that the command’s growth and improvement depended on the growth 
and improvement of its people as individuals (versus teams). To facilitate this 
critical individual development, TALK 101 encouraged personal reflection, 
conducted interactive group exercises, and incorporated personal testimonies 
from leaders across the command on how they applied learning-organization 
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concepts to improve themselves and the command. The workshop encouraged 
some participants to seek out gaps in their performance so they could improve 
on them to help improve shipyard performance. All these activities served to 
foster dialogue, which helped to start new relationships, strengthen existing 
ones, build trust, and improve communication skills. A nuclear business of-
ficer at the shipyard commented, “We all learned how to conduct a skillful 
dialogue to best share information and opinions.” This was especially relevant 
because poor communication and weak relationships between managers and 
supervisors had been flagged as a reason why leadership often was unaware of 
problems at the shipyard.
The Personal Mastery Executive Workshop (PMEW) was another way that 
PHNS cultivated leaders. It was developed in response to a significant “say-do 
gap” among shipyard leaders. While efforts to educate the shipyard workforce 
about learning-organization concepts were flourishing, this say-do gap among 
many in formal leadership positions hindered the overall transformation 
process. As the gap between leaders’ words and actions grew, doubts about 
the efficacy of becoming a learning organization arose, negatively impacting 
even those who truly were committed to the process. To eliminate this gap, the 
PMEW concentrated on aligning leaders with their roles and responsibilities 
as facilitators of organizational change at the shipyard. The weeklong work-
shop focused on the core competencies of leaders in a learning organization, 
highlighting the importance of establishing a vision and plans that supported 
organizational goals, such as increasing emotional intelligence, building trust, 
and effectively leading those who still were learning about the five disciplines 
and other aspects of learning organizations.
While leaders were cultivated, in part, through formal education and train-
ing, it became clear to the shipyard that performance-improvement activities 
such as these were successful only when participants committed to being en-
gaged actively both during and after the events. To promote postactivity engage-
ment, the shipyard created the “personal mastery support structure,” designed 
to foster continual learning. Leaders participating in the PMEW, for example, 
were required to speak with their supervisors on the last day of the workshop, 
declaring their commitment to the organization and explaining their plans for 
making progress in their individual areas of responsibility. This was followed 
by embedding their improvement plans into their performance objectives and 
organizational self-assessments, to ensure individual accountability. Peer-to-
peer gatherings known as “reunions” also became part of the personal mastery 
support structure. These events provided a forum for first-line supervisors and 
their peers to sit with their department heads in an informal setting to discuss 
progress on supervisors’ personal-development plans, review course content, 
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and talk about other topics related to improving performance. Finally, mentor-
ing relationships among peers (who became known as “accountability part-
ners”) were another means to encourage sustained engagement, and thereby to 
enable the shipyard’s conversion into a learning organization.
IMPROVING SHIPYARD PERFORMANCE
Educating the shipyard workforce about learning-organization concepts and 
practices yielded improvements in three main areas: problem solving, motiva-
tion, and teamwork. Problem-solving capabilities were enhanced, for instance, 
by redesigning PHNS’s original Critique Program to align with the learning-
organization disciplines of mental models and team learning. The Critique 
Program had existed to address unanticipated events that were problematic. 
PHNS unnecessarily employed a top-down approach to solving these prob-
lems, focusing primarily on holding people accountable for mistakes or failures 
rather than viewing these events as opportunities to learn. In contrast, by re-
designing the program to take a bottom-up approach to problem solving and 
create a safe learning environment, the shipyard shifted from assigning blame 
to encouraging all workers to apply their critical-thinking skills to solve prob-
lems. Essentially, the program redesign changed team members’ mental models 
about the nature and purpose of a critique. No longer perceived as a mechanism 
simply to hold individuals accountable (which imbued a sense of negativity), 
critiques became an opportunity to learn from mistakes, as well as to leverage 
teams’ diverse and innovative approaches to solving problems.
This shift in approach resulted in an increased level of motivation and per-
formance based on a shared vision. A noteworthy example of this concerned 
a project to repair USS Olympia (a Los Angeles–class submarine). In mid-June 
2007, PHNS committed to NAVSEA to complete planned valve repairs to 
Olympia by 15 August. However, many at PHNS were concerned that this goal 
would not be achieved, since about 80 percent of the valve team—the marine 
machinery mechanics and supervisors assigned to the task—had less than one 
year of experience, while the production schedule would have been demanding 
even for an experienced, senior team.
The Olympia project-management team and Machine Shop 38 (the lead 
shop for this assignment) decided to introduce learning-organization princi-
ples to the valve team to ensure its success. Senior leaders briefed the mechanics 
on these principles and followed up by organizing workers-only brainstorming 
sessions at which mechanics were encouraged to speak up and discuss what 
they needed to do. The mechanics then developed and delivered a prioritized 
list of activities and needs to the project supervisor, which were acted on. For 
example, they identified a need for more space and help to stage the mechanics’ 
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gear; a vacant enclosure was moved to the work area and additional tools were 
supplied. In addition to responding to workers’ identified needs, “project 
management shared information about status, milestones, and schedules with 
workers in regular briefings and by posting charts.” This enabled the work-
ers to become part of the shared vision of “15 valves by August 15.” Having a 
shared vision helped the mechanics (who generally had been assigned their 
work one task at a time) to understand the big picture—in other words, how 
an individual’s job impacted other jobs and schedules. Another team was as-
signed to fast-track workers’ ideas for improvements. All these efforts resulted 
in a noticeable trend as the work progressed, in which the mechanics became 
more familiar with valve repair and associated scheduling implications to the 
project overall and were motivated to improve their performance. In fact, the 
mechanics’ performance improved to the point that they finished the project 
one day early and under budget.31 
As one might imagine, mastering the learning-organization discipline of 
team learning (a discipline that builds on shared vision and personal mastery) 
improved teamwork at PHNS in significant ways. According to Senge, team 
learning is the process of aligning and developing the capacity of a team to cre-
ate the results its members truly desire. A collective discipline, team learning 
has the following three critical dimensions: (1) it fosters collective intelligence; 
(2) it enables teams to act in spontaneous, yet coordinated, ways through “op-
erational trust”; and (3) it promotes learning beyond one team to other teams.32 
In December 2014, PHNS was designated the “Corporate Lead Shipyard,” 
responsible for executing a complex and critical repair on active nuclear sub-
marines. A demanding process, the repair called for around-the-clock shifts six 
days a week for ten months, as well as for qualifying new and improved meth-
odologies, such as compact Freon freeze seal, critical complex nuclear mock-up 
training, and multisubmarine team execution. In addition, all three of these 
methodologies required critical assessments and refinement of research and 
development, nuclear training, mechanical skills proficiency training, design of 
special tools, and personnel qualifications.33 In short, the complexity and difficul-
ty of this repair mission meant that if the shipyard was to succeed it would have 
to mature rapidly in its “productioneering”—team learning—efforts toward plan-
ning, training, and execution of critical, complex, and high-risk nuclear work.34 
Accordingly, the shipyard conducted a variety of activities, including a rapid-
improvement event (RIE) based on team-learning dimensions. The RIE engaged 
deck-plate experts (e.g., mechanics, engineers, technicians, training instructors, 
and first-line supervisors) to increase ownership, improve self-accountability, 
develop improvement items and processes, and define team values. Doing so 
helped them define a vision for the mission. The RIE also taught critical thinking 
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skills and self-reflection, both of which facilitated individual and team improve-
ment. In essence, “the RIE shaped a culture change that drove a new team battle 
cry, success is achieved through ‘T.E.A.M.’ = Tactically Executing Anticipated 
Movement.”35 This culture change was evidenced by the team’s transparency, 
communication, and cohesiveness, which together demonstrated a discernible 
unity among multiple trades/shops and engineering codes.36 
TRANSFORMING THE SHIPYARD AND THE NAVY
By prioritizing the development of the key learning-organization competencies 
outlined in The Fifth Discipline—specifically, personal mastery, mental models, 
shared vision, team learning, and systems thinking—over the past ten-plus years, 
PHNS successfully changed its trajectory from a shipyard that was threatened 
with closure to one that excels in its mission of repairing, maintaining, and mod-
ernizing the U.S. Pacific Fleet. No longer responding to changes and problems 
in a hierarchical, stovepiped, and often reproachful manner, as they often had 
done before becoming a learning organization, shipyard leaders today leverage 
collective intelligence and experience to deal with issues that arise. They do this 
by continuing to practice learning-organization principles deliberately, both per-
sonally and with their teams. By eliminating the say-do gap often associated with 
effecting change, PHNS leaders not only model the behavior they seek in others 
but motivate shipyard workers at all levels to do the same. This has transformed 
the culture of the shipyard, enhancing its overall performance and increasing the 
satisfaction of its employees.
Senge’s learning-organization principles not only have assisted PHNS in becom-
ing the organization it wants to be but also provide a possible framework for 
the Navy to transform its traditional command-and-control hierarchies to less-
rigid structures that allow for rapid knowledge transfer, effective information 
sharing, and continual learning. The transparent and aspirational nature of a 
learning-organization culture also encourages humility and reflection—qualities 
necessary for adapting to the generational shift the Navy and industry are expe-
riencing today. Learning-organization fundamentals can galvanize large groups 
of people and transcend generational differences by helping to generate a shared 
purpose (vision) to achieve the desired future. And finally, the five disciplines 
of a learning organization also promote adaptability—a critical attribute when 
dealing with the highly dynamic and complex environments of the twenty-first 
century. Considering the multiple and recurring benefits of cultivating a learn-
ing culture, Navy leaders might consider incorporating the five disciplines, or 
other frameworks that facilitate continuous learning, as a way to transform their 
organizations into the ones they seek.
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